



METHANOL INSTITUTE

Crisis Communications Guidebook

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Introduction: Key Points

This Crisis Communication Guidebook has been developed to assist companies that produce, handle or use methanol to be prepared to react in the event of an unforeseen incident. In a nutshell, a company needs to focus on three primary steps:

- Identifying the roles that make up the Emergency Response Team (ERT), and determining which individuals will fill those roles (see section 2.31 for further details).
- Gathering contact information for local, regional and other important agencies, including emergency responders, governmental functions and the media (see section 2.52). Once the contacts have been listed, personal introductions should be made where appropriate.
- Planning and conducting regularly-scheduled emergency drills and exercises, including having the participation of the appropriate local emergency responders and even the media (see additional comments regarding this step in section 6.4).

There is much other valuable information supplied in this Guidebook, but following these three basic steps can make a difference between night and day for a company experiencing any significant emergency incident.

Fact-Based Fictional Scenario

The Acme Methanol Company is notified at 2 am on August 17, 2006 that an explosion involving methanol has occurred at the Jefferson Township wastewater treatment facility. Acme supplies methanol to the facility for use in tertiary treatment. One employee died and one was severely burned after a worker using a cutting torch accidentally ignited vapors coming from the methanol storage tank vent. An explosion inside the tank followed, causing the attached piping to fail and release about 2,000 gallons of methanol, which burned.

Acme was initially contacted by Jefferson Township public safety authorities for information on proper emergency responses procedures and the potential long-term impact on the workers and local residents being exposed to methanol. The township requested specific information on what type of foam to use, what type of absorbent to use, and the aqua toxicity of methanol. Acme provided advice over the phone and also sent an employee to the facility to assist in response and cleanup activities.

The following day, the local media contacted Acme and asked about the risk posed by methanol, whether it is safe to use methanol, and if the treatment facility operators were properly trained. On the same day, investigators from the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) visited the site. The CSB examined and collected physical evidence from the incident, interviewed facility employees and others, and reviewed relevant documents. After completing its investigation, over a year later, the CSB found that the scope, content, and frequency of the training provided to treatment plant employees did not adequately prepare them to deal with the hazards associated with flammable materials such as methanol.

Acme had been supplying methanol to the wastewater treatment facility for more than two years. During that time, on several occasions, Acme provided guidance material and offered training opportunities. When the explosion occurred, Acme was well positioned to offer assistance. However, Acme was not as well prepared to handle related issues, most notably the media's interest in the explosion and the safety of methanol; and the involvement of the Chemical Safety Board, and the resulting investigation that kept the media attention alive for more than a year.

Acme acted responsibly – following basic product stewardship principles – before and after the crisis. However, Acme was frustrated by the media perception that they somehow contributed to the crisis, and by being put in the position of defending the use of methanol in general. Throughout the crisis, Acme was the source of information whenever technical questions were raised about methanol: Is it a gas or a chemical? Where does it come from? What are the risks? Why is it used? Acme answered the questions, but by doing so they were continually associated with the explosion.

Acme believed the crisis would pass and media attention – local and national – would die down. Thus, they were surprised when periodically there was resumed interest in the explosion and its aftermath. The interest coincided with visits from the Chemical Safety Board to Jefferson Township. Each time an investigator arrived in town, a story appeared in the local paper, and the subject matter of the articles expanded from the explosion to an analysis of the safety of methanol. To compound the problem, the Chemical Safety Board routinely issued press releases that were posted on its web site and became the basis of news reports. The CSB was doing its job, and doing it well, but an unintended consequence was Acme had to continually engage in crisis communication.

Lessons Learned

- Acme was well prepared to assist Jefferson Township in responding to the crisis.
- Jefferson Township did not accept Acme's offer to provide guidance and training. This contributed to the finding that the scope, content, and frequency of the training provided to treatment plant employees did not adequately prepare them to deal with the hazards associated with flammable materials such as methanol. In hindsight, Acme should review whether it made all reasonable efforts to engage the township and encourage it to accept the training offer, including seeking the support of the Methanol Institute in such outreach.
- Acme did not anticipate that they would be so involved in crisis communication for a facility they did not own and that was located 1,000 miles away. Acme was able to address technical questions regarding methanol but had difficulty with the risk-related questions, such as: Does methanol pose a greater risk than chlorine? Is there a less risky alternative to methanol? Again, the institute may have been able to provide further assistance.
- Acme did not anticipate the impact the presence of the Chemical Safety Board would have on press coverage. In hindsight, Acme realizes it should have worked closely with the CSB, been aware of upcoming visits and press releases/announcements, and coordinated information flow.

1.1 The Crisis Communication Guidebook

Incidents such as the one presented in the above fictional but plausible scenario happen. They happen regardless of how committed a company may be to risk reduction and incident prevention. A company with a spotless safety record can have an incident; incidents can also occur at trusted transport interfaces, port areas and pipelines. Most importantly, downstream customers have incidents, as presented in the above scenario.

Members of the Methanol Institute (MI) are committed to risk reduction and incident prevention, as well as effective emergency preparedness and response, in order to protect health, the environment and property. They are committed to effective communication and cooperation with other stakeholders – employees, public authorities at all levels, members of the community/public – on all aspects of incident prevention, preparedness and response. They believe that communication and cooperation should be based on a policy of openness, as well as the shared objective of reducing the likelihood of incidents and mitigating the adverse affects of any incidents that do occur. They believe that the potentially affected public should receive information needed to support prevention and preparedness objectives.

MI members believe that all enterprises that produce, use, store, or otherwise handle methanol should undertake, in cooperation with other stakeholders, the hazard identification and risk assessment(s) needed in the event of an incident for a complete understanding of the risks to employees, the public, the environment and property. Hazard identification and risk assessments should be undertaken from the earliest stages of design and construction, throughout operation and maintenance, and even during decommissioning/closure/demolition.

They should address the possibilities of human or technological failures, as well as releases resulting from natural disasters or deliberate acts (such as terrorism, sabotage, vandalism, or theft). Such assessments should be repeated periodically and whenever there are significant modifications to the installation.

1.2 Guidebook Intentions

This Guidebook is intended to be used by MI members, their customers, and other stakeholders, to assist in preventing, preparing for and responding to a crisis situation. The Guidebook is not intended to take the place of, but rather to supplement company procedures and guidance. MI member companies generally have comprehensive policies and procedures in place, and they don't need to be instructed in their responsibilities and capabilities. However, they can benefit from additional information and guidance that enhance their existing procedures, particularly involving communication during and after a crisis. Consequently, the Guidebook is less a procedural manual and more of a reference document to supplement existing knowledge and operations.

Thus, the Guidebook serves several purposes:

- Documents principles and procedures currently followed by MI companies
- Presents commitments and programs of the Methanol Institute and its member companies
- Provides guidance to MI members and their customers
- Presents global resources and initiatives relating to emergency management, terrorism, risk communication, product stewardship, and incident investigation
- Provides a statement of the industry's willingness to do more: to communicate more effectively, to better understand the needs of downstream customers, and to learn from crises and apply the lessons to reduce and avoid future incidents

1.3 Disclaimer

As part of its commitment to methanol product stewardship, the Methanol Institute has prepared this Guidebook. The information, procedures, recommendations and data presented in this Guidebook are informational only and the Guidebook is designed to provide general guidance only. The Methanol Institute and the report authors assume no liability whatsoever with respect to the accuracy and completeness of the information, procedures, recommendations and data presented in this Guidebook and disclaim all liability arising out of the use of such information, procedures, recommendations and data. Each user of this Guidebook must still use its own independent judgment and discretion in ensuring that it handles methanol safely/communicates appropriately, and in doing so must develop the specific systems that best fit its management structure, product lines, location, and other factors that are unique to the user. This Guidebook is not a substitute for applicable laws and regulations, nor does it alter the obligation of the user to comply fully with federal, state and local law.

2 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

2.1 Global Commitment to Principles

MI members have a global commitment to risk reduction and incident prevention, as well as effective emergency preparedness and response. The principles and practices employed are based on the premise that all methanol facilities should comply with the same safety objectives, irrespective of size and location. The commitment applies not only to facilities where methanol is produced or reformulated, but also to other industries and customers that use or handle methanol in their operations, as well as storage facilities.

The methanol industry commitment is comprehensive and covers the range of emergency management safety continuum:

- Preventing the occurrence of incidents
- Preparing for incidents, and mitigating adverse effects of incidents through emergency planning and communication with government officials and the public
- Responding to incidents that do occur in order to minimize the adverse consequences to health, the environment and property, and
- Following up after incidents, including initial clean-up activities, and incident reporting and investigation

Many countries, as well as states, provinces, and localities have legislated emergency management requirements. The methanol industry certainly complies with such requirements, however, the industry objective is to go beyond compliance, and is based on the commitment to adopt – and contribute to – global standards and principles. Specifically, MI members embrace the Principles for Chemical Accident Prevention, Preparedness and Response– adopted by the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (see Exhibit A).

The principles presented in this Guidebook are based on current operations of MI members. The intention is to allow flexibility in their application, so that MI members and customers can choose the relevant provisions and adapt them in light of their particular circumstances, including the local culture, legal context, nature of the risks, and the extent and type of resources available. Thus, not all provisions will apply in all circumstances.

EXHIBIT A OECD

OECD Guiding principles

The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is an intergovernmental organization in which representatives of 30 industrialized countries (from Europe, North America, and the Pacific) and the European Commission meet to co-ordinate and harmonize policies, discuss issues of mutual interest, and work together to respond to international concerns. Most of the OECD's work is carried out by more than 200 specialized committees and subsidiary groups made up of member country delegates. Observers from several countries with special status at the OECD, and from interested international organizations, attend many of the OECD's meetings. Committees and subsidiary groups are served by the OECD Secretariat, located in Paris, France, which is organized into Directorates and Divisions.

The work of the OECD related to chemical accident prevention, preparedness and response is carried out by the Working Group on Chemical Accidents (WGCA), with Secretariat support from the Environment, Health and Safety (EHS) Division of the Environment Directorate. The objectives of the Chemical Accidents Programme include development of guidance materials related to chemical accident prevention, preparedness and response, exchange of information and experience, and analysis of specific issues of mutual concern in OECD member countries.

As part of its work on chemical accidents, the OECD has issued several Council Decisions and Recommendations (the former legally binding on member countries), as well as numerous Guidance Documents and technical reports. Additional publications include the *Guidance on Safety Performance Indicators* (to be published in 2003); *Guidance Concerning Chemical Safety in Port Areas* (a joint effort with the IMO); *Guidance Concerning Health Aspects of Chemical Accidents*; the joint OECD/UNEP/OCHA *International Directory of Emergency Response Centres*; and reports of the various workshops.

EXHIBIT B EPCRA

U.S. State and Local Chemical Emergency Response Bodies

The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA) establishes requirements for federal, State and local governments and industry regarding emergency planning and "Community Right-to-Know" reporting on hazardous and toxic chemicals. The Community Right-to-Know provisions are intended to help increase the public's knowledge and access to information on chemicals at individual facilities, their uses, and releases into the environment. States and communities, working with facilities, can use the information to improve chemical safety and protect public health and the environment.

One of the key provisions of EPCRA was the requirement of state Governors to designate a State Emergency Response Commission (SERC). The SERCs, in turn, designated about 3,500 local emergency planning districts and appointed Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs) for each district. The SERC supervises and coordinates the activities of the LEPC, establishes procedures for receiving and processing public requests for information collected under EPCRA, and reviews local emergency response plans.

Since the passage the EPCRA, many SERCs and LEPCs have developed their own identity and operating style, and in some cases, have added responsibilities, such as chemical facility security. Industry representatives –including Methanol Institute members – often serve on SERCs and LEPCs and assist in planning and preparedness activities.

If they have not already done so, MI members, their customers, and transportation providers should develop working relationships with SERCs and LEPCs. Members of these bodies include public safety officials, such as fire, police and emergency management. In addition, representatives of the media and other community leaders also serve on many LEPCs and SERCs.

2.2 Prevention

MI members have well-established procedures to prevent incidents. The specifics of the procedures may vary but all are based on the following concepts:

- **Safety Culture:** Establish the concept that chemical safety is an integral part of all phases of the methanol installation enterprise from design and construction, through operation and maintenance, to decommissioning/closure/demolition.
- **Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment:** Understand risks and make sound decisions in the selection and prioritization of prevention and control strategies. Risk assessment allows risk to be ranked on a relative scale and technical and organizational options to be evaluated in order to maximize increased safety.
- **Site selection, design, and construction:** The siting of methanol facilities is done in a manner that incorporates sound land-use principles to minimize the potential adverse effects to health, the environment and property in the event of an incident at the facility, or during transport of methanol to and from the facility. Safety measures are incorporated at the earliest

conceptual and engineering design stages of a facility to enhance the inherent safety of the installation wherever practicable.

- Operation: Management ensures that organizational arrangement for implementing the corporate safety policies is established, with the roles and responsibilities related to safety clearly defined for all employees.

2.3 Preparedness/Mitigation


MI members have on-site emergency plans appropriate for the individual facility that are based on a complete range of incident scenarios, including most probable releases and worst-case scenarios. The plans may vary but all are based on the following concepts:

- On-site emergency plans identify the roles and responsibilities of all parties that make up the Emergency Response Team, and clearly indicate the chain of command and coordination among the parties, lines of communication, and the means of obtaining necessary information.
- All employees at a MI member facility are made fully aware of the relevant provisions of the on-site emergency plan. In particular, they are aware of what to do in the event of an emergency, such as taking action to limit the release of methanol and evacuating the installation and gathering at a previously-designated assembly point.
- Management at facilities works with public authorities in the development of off-site plans to ensure that the officials responsible have all necessary information, including that needed to assess hazards and help ensure the compatibility of off-site and on-site plans.
- The industry cooperates with local government to ensure that the potentially affected public has the appropriate information to understand the risks they face and what they should do in the event of an incident. Management and other employees maintain close relations with community leaders, education facilities and other members of the community in order to help promote education of communities concerning risk concepts.
- Methanol facilities in the same geographic area of other industry (including, for example, enterprises within port areas or enterprises in an industrial site) coordinate their on-site plans and response activities in order to ensure the plans are consistent, and to establish systems for mutual aid when needed.

2.3.1 Establishing an Emergency Response Team

The size and makeup of each site's Emergency Response Team (ERT) will depend on the individual nature of the facility. Some of the more typical positions that might make up an ERT are shown in the following diagram:

Emergency Response Team Organizational Chart



Once the ERT organizational chart has been established, it is equally important to define which specific individuals will fill each role. It should then also be clearly established as to how the ERT will be prepared to communicate among its members in the event of an incident. As incidents can occur at any time of day or night, preparations should be put into place to provide for prompt and efficient communication on a 24/7 basis. Some companies have taken a step further and had brightly colored vests made for each position on the ERT. Having each person clearly identified can bring an extra level of order to a potentially otherwise chaotic event.

2.4 Emergency Response

Emergency response primarily consists of implementing the emergency plans developed during the preparedness/mitigation phase. Thus, the focus of emergency response is in the local area where an incident has occurred and emphasizes the importance of working with local response authorities: fire, emergency medical, police and medical facilities. MI members engage in response drills and tabletop exercise and embrace the following policies and principles:

- In the event of an incident involving methanol, facility management immediately activates the on-site emergency plan.
- If a methanol-related incident threatens to cause harm to health, the environment or property off-site, or cannot be handled by on-site response resources, management promptly alerts local emergency response authorities.
- If an off-site plan is activated, facility management is prepared to assist response personnel with information, expertise and other resources, as needed.
- The methanol facility on-site plan contains clear criteria that establish when public authorities should be called to respond to incidents with potential off-site effects. The plan criteria make it clear at what stage public authorities are contacted, and who to contact.
- The involvement of public authorities does not change the fact that management remains responsible for the safety of its facility, including the adverse effects of any incident.

2.5 Risk Communication

MI members recognize that communication with the public during times of crisis is a joint responsibility of public authorities and industry, and that different countries and communities allocate responsibility for communication differently. The industry's commitment to communicate extends to all phases of the emergency management safety continuum: prevention, preparation, response and mitigation, and follow-up.

Sound and thoughtful risk communication can assist industry in preventing ineffective, fear-driven, and potentially damaging public responses to serious crises such as a methanol explosion. Appropriate risk communication procedures foster the trust and confidence that are vital to a crisis situation.

2.5.1 Core Principles

For each phase of the emergency management continuum there are some core principles that should be followed regarding the communication of risk information. Members of the public who might be affected in the event of a methanol-related incident have the right to appropriate information so that they can be aware of the hazards and risks arising from facilities in their community, and are able to act appropriately should an incident occur. The information provided to the affected public should include guidance on what to expect in the event of an incident, including the following:

- Details about how the public will be warned of an incident, or imminent threat of an incident
- Guidance on what actions should be taken, and why, in the event of an incident. The guidance is adapted to meet the needs of different groups, including sensitive sub-populations, such as those in hospitals, schools, and homes for the elderly

- Sources of post-incident information (such as radio or TV) and sources of additional explanation and information (such as an industry source and the local emergency management office), including how members of the public will be informed when the crisis situation is over

This type of information should be provided in a timely fashion, and be reissued periodically as appropriate, and be updated as necessary.

2.5.2 Identifying Key Audiences and Delivering Information

The members of the public potentially affected by a crisis should be carefully delineated, and information should be targeted, so that all affected parties have adequate and appropriate information presented in an easily understandable manner. It is important to understand that the public is not homogeneous and, therefore, consideration should be given to whether there is a need to design different messages for different groups based on age, gender, culture/language, educational background and level of risk.

The information provided to the public should be widely comprehensible and be provided in a format and language that is easily read and understood. Ideally, members of the community are consulted to help ensure that the message developed and the language used is appropriate for the community.

Company representatives designated to communicate to the public must recognize that messages will be interpreted by the recipients, filtered based on individual experience and evaluated based on levels of trust and other factors (such as whether there have been conflicting messages). It is important to understand these influences and to shape the messages accordingly. In addition to targeting information at the potentially affected public, companies can also educate the general public about the risk associated with methanol incidents and the types of actions that should be taken in the event of an incident.

The responsibility for communicating information should be assigned to individuals with appropriate knowledge and skills, who are viewed as intelligent and credible, and may enjoy the respect of the community. Employees at methanol facilities can play a role in helping to inform and educate members of their communities. Informed employees can serve as important safety ambassadors within their community, since they have a strong incentive to protect themselves, their families and their neighborhoods. The media are a channel of information to the general public, and their input should be encouraged in the development and implementation of the risk communication process. There should be a clearly identified media source or sources for obtaining information in the event of an incident, and the public should be informed accordingly.

APPENDIX I contains suggestions for gathering the appropriate contact and coordinate information for many common agencies and authorities.

3 Fixed Installations and Transport

Many MI members own transport installations or rely upon such facilities to ship methanol. The commitment to these installations is the same as to fixed facilities: risk reduction and incident prevention, as well as effective emergency preparedness and response. The emergency management principles presented in the previous section apply to transport installations, however many MI members have developed supplemental principles relating to the following:

- Transport interfaces in general, such as railroad marshalling yards, road terminals, and loading and unloading facilities
- Port areas
- Pipelines

3.1 Transport Interfaces

MI members have developed principles and procedures for dealing with crises at various types of transport interfaces, including railroad marshalling yards, road terminals, and loading and unloading facilities. The principles and procedures typically incorporate the following concepts:

- The geographical boundaries of transport interfaces that handle methanol should be clearly defined and should include areas where methanol is handled, transported and/or kept temporarily.
- The various parties involved in handling methanol at transport interfaces should cooperate to help ensure safe operation and to provide emergency preparedness and response. These parties typically include operators of transport interfaces, the carriers/transporters for all modes of transport that utilize the interface, cargo interests, customers, public authorities and others.
- All parties involved should ensure that they have access to information necessary to fulfill their responsibilities for the safe handling of cargoes containing methanol and to provide methanol information to others.

3.2 Port Areas

Port areas are subject to the same principles and procedures as transport interfaces, and therefore, previously presented guidance applies. However, further guidance is warranted because port areas have certain additional characteristics, including the following:

- Ports are inherently international in nature, with operators, ships and cargoes coming from different countries.
- Ports are large, complex entities involving sea-going traffic and inland (river, rail and road) transport of methanol and other hazardous substances. Ports likely contain a number of fixed installations including terminals, warehouses, and repair/maintenance facilities where methanol and other substances are transferred, used, handled or stored.
- The complexity of port areas complicates land-use planning decisions related to developments both within and outside these areas.

- Ports tend to be located near large, densely populated areas, and waterfront locations often attract housing and other developments.
- The ship-shore interface creates the potential, on an operational level, for a conflict of interest between environmental protection and marine safety.

3.3 Pipelines

The emergency management principles presented in the previous section apply to pipelines, however many MI members have developed specific principles for pipelines transporting methanol and ancillary facilities, such as pumping and compression stations.

Pipelines are recognized as an increasingly important option for transporting a variety of hazardous substances in addition to petrochemicals. Experience indicates that they are generally safe, and for certain substances, a vital means for transport. Among the advantages of pipelines is that they can move large quantities of hazardous substances quickly, relatively inexpensively and reliably, with relatively few associated impacts on the environment (as compared with other transport modes that involve vehicular exhaust, aesthetic impacts, noise, and congestion).

The disadvantages of pipelines include infrastructure costs associated with construction, the delays inherent in making a pipeline operational, the problems associated with soil protection, and the lack of flexibility in regard to delivery points and quantities that can be transported.

Regulatory approaches to pipelines differ significantly among countries, although there are common elements in most approaches (including a general obligation to operate safely). Despite the differences in regulatory approaches, industry appears to have similar safety practices in different countries in order to maintain the integrity of pipeline networks.

4 Terrorism

MI member companies have taken an active role in securing facilities, supply chains and information systems against terrorist attacks as well as sabotage. The companies work with partners in the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the states, the chemical sector and other industries to prevent facilities and products from being used to harm employees, the public and the environment.

Methanol is included in the 2007 DHS Interim Final Rule on Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS). Section 550 of CFATS applies to chemical facilities that “present high levels of security risk.” The definition of “chemical facility” is extremely broad: “any establishment that possesses, or plans to possess, at any relevant point in time, a quantity of a chemical substance determined by [DHS] to be potentially dangerous or that meets other risk-related criteria identified by [DHS].”

DHS requires owners of chemical facilities housing certain quantities of any of these substances to complete a preliminary screening assessment that determines the level of risk associated with the facility. If a chemical facility preliminarily qualifies as high risk, its owners will be required to prepare and submit a security vulnerability assessment and site security plan.

DHS uses a web-based screening tool called “Top-Screen” to determine if a chemical facility is high-risk. If DHS concludes that it is, such a “covered facility” is then subject to other requirements.

MI members are fully implementing the DHS requirements. More importantly, companies are using DHS principles, procedures, and tools (such as Top-Screen) to develop plans for facilities around the globe.

5 Incident Investigations

MI members support the investigation of all incidents involving methanol at their facilities, whether conducted by the company, or by the public authorities when appropriate. A safety investigation should be a fact-finding activity to learn from experience, not an exercise designed to allocate blame or liability. There should be full cooperation between the operational staff at the facility and those involved in the investigation. MI believes the focus of these investigations should be on identifying the underlying causes in a chain of events leading to the incident, the lessons learned, and ways to prevent similar incidents in the future. The investigation should not be limited to determining the immediate or apparent cause(s). The methanol industry recognizes that incidents are generally the final stage of a long sequence of events in which there is a complex interplay between technical defects, human error and insufficient management.

There will be differences between industry-initiated investigations and investigations by public authorities –such as the US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (Exhibit D). However, many of the principles will be similar. Typically, industry-initiated investigations will be conducted separately from those initiated by public authorities, although MI members believe that joint investigations are desirable.

EXHIBIT C CSB

US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board

The US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) is an independent federal agency charged with investigating industrial chemical accidents. Headquartered in Washington, DC, the agency's board members are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.

The CSB conducts root cause investigations of chemical accidents at fixed industrial facilities. Root causes are usually deficiencies in safety management systems, but can be any factor that would have prevented the accident if that factor had not occurred. Other accident causes often involve equipment failures, human errors, unforeseen chemical reactions or other hazards. The agency does not issue fines or citations, but does make recommendations to plants, regulatory agencies such as the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), industry organizations, and labor groups. Congress designed the CSB to be non-regulatory and independent of other agencies so that its investigations might, where appropriate, review the effectiveness of regulations and regulatory enforcement.

The CSB investigative staff includes chemical and mechanical engineers, industrial safety experts, and other specialists with experience in the private and public sectors. Many investigators have years of chemical industry experience.

After a CSB team reaches a chemical incident site, investigators begin their work by conducting detailed interviews of witnesses such as plant employees, managers, and neighbors. Chemical samples and equipment obtained from accident sites are sent to independent laboratories for testing. Company safety records, inventories, and operating procedures are examined as investigators seek an understanding of the circumstances of the accident.

Over a course of several months, investigators sift through evidence, consult with Board members, and review regulations and industry practices before drafting key findings, root causes and recommendations. During the process, investigators may confer with plant managers, workers, labor groups, and other government authorities. The investigative process generally takes six to twelve months to complete, and a draft report is then submitted to the Board for consideration. Reports may be adopted through a written vote of the Board or in a formal public meeting near the incident site or in Washington, DC.

In addition to investigations of specific accidents, the Board is authorized to conduct investigations of more general chemical accident hazards, whether or not an accident has already occurred. In 2002, the Board's first hazard investigation on reactive chemicals reviewed more than 150 serious accidents involving uncontrolled chemical reactions in industry. This investigation led to new recommendations to OSHA and EPA for regulatory changes. A second hazard investigation on combustible dusts is now in progress.

Both accident investigations and hazard investigations lead to new safety recommendations, which are the Board's principal tool for achieving positive change. Recommendations are issued to government agencies, companies, trade associations, labor unions, and other groups. Implementation of each safety recommendation is tracked and monitored by CSB staff. When recommended actions have been completed satisfactorily, the recommendation may be closed by a Board vote.

While some recommendations may be adopted immediately, others require extensive effort and advocacy to achieve implementation. Board members and staff work to promote safety actions based on CSB recommendations. In many cases, the lessons from CSB investigations are applicable to many organizations beyond the company investigated.

Many CSB recommendations have been implemented in industry, leading to safer plants, workers, and communities. Incident investigations conducted by public authorities typically result in increased media attention and a heightened need for effective risk communication. Thus, the following principles and guidance apply:

- Cooperate early and continually with the public authorities conducting the investigation, including the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board; the U.S. Coast Guard Marine Safety, Security and Stewardship, Office of Investigation and Analysis; and similar national and global bodies.
- Understand that the press releases, interviews, and reports issued by these bodies will be viewed with great credibility. Thus, volunteer to provide technical information and other assistance that will enhance the communication of information.
- Know when public authorities have scheduled visits, press conferences, and reports, and be prepared to comment and supplement. The ideal situation may be to participate in the press conference as an information resource.
- You might consider whether to issue a press release that references and supplements the public authority press release. The CSB typically notifies involved companies on their pending announcements. Exhibit E is an example of a press release issued immediately after an incident has occurred. Exhibit F is an example of a press release a company may want to issue just prior to a scheduled CSB event.

EXHIBIT D: Press Release (immediately after an incident at a customer facility)

ACME METHANOL COMPANY

Providing Efficient Energy

October 26, 2007

ACME Provides Assistance Following Explosion at Jefferson City Facility

Acme Town, State – The Acme Methanol Company has dispatched an emergency response team to Jefferson Township to assist in responding to a methanol-related incident at the town's water treatment facility. The Acme team will provide emergency response support and will assist local and state responders in protecting the health of the workers, the community, and the environment. The accident occurred at the Jefferson City Water Treatment facility. The cause and extent of the accident has not yet been determined. Acme provides methanol to the facility for use in tertiary treatment.

Acme was initially contacted by Jefferson Township public safety authorities for information on proper emergency responses procedures and the potential long-term impact of the workers and local residents being exposed to methanol. The Township requested specific information on what type of foam to use, what type of absorbent to use, and the aqua toxicity of methanol. Acme provided advice over the phone and also mobilized a team to assist in response and cleanup activities.

As with all of its customers, Acme is committed to being a good steward, providing information, guidance, and training opportunities, and being available to assist should an incident occur. Acme had been supplying methanol to the wastewater treatment facility for over two years. During that time, on several occasions, Acme has provided guidance material and offered training opportunities to facility staff. Acme has also met with the Jefferson Township Local Emergency Planning Committee.

The Acme assistance team is headed by Jim Thunder, a process safety engineer, with experience in facility design and emergency response. "Jim and his team should be a valued resource to the local response group," stated Dr. James Miller, Acme's Vice president for Environmental Health and Safety. "We are committed to providing whatever assistance we can, we are methanol experts and are always willing to share our knowledge."

For additional information on methanol contact the Methanol Institute at www.methanol.org. The institute represents the global methanol industry and is committed to product stewardship: "The Methanol Institute provides unique methanol-related services. A primary goal is ensuring the safe handling of methanol throughout the distribution chain, including the proper use of methanol in any downstream applications."

EXHIBIT E Press Release (just prior to a scheduled CSB event)

ACME METHANOL COMPANY

Providing Efficient Energy

June 28, 2008

U.S. Chemical Safety Board to Announce Preliminary Findings Regarding Jefferson Township Incident

Acme Town, State – The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) will be holding a press conference at 10AM, June 29, at the Jefferson City courthouse, to announce preliminary findings regarding last year’s accident at the wastewater treatment facility.

As a methanol supplier committed to safety, the Acme Methanol Company fully supports the CSB’s investigation, Acme, like CSB, wants to understand how the accident occurred in order to reduce the likelihood of future incidents occurring at other customers’ facilities. Acme is committed to providing guidance and assistance to their customers to ensure the safe handling of methanol throughout the distribution chain. Accordingly, the company has worked closely with the CSB by providing technical information about methanol, and in determining how best to ensure the likelihood of accidents such as Jefferson City is reduced.

The primary point of contact with the CSB has been Dr. James Miller, Acme’s Vice President for Environment Health and Safety who commented: “We are methanol experts, and are always willing to share our knowledge.”

In addition to sharing Acme information and resources, Dr. Miller also referred the CSB to the Methanol Institute, which represents the global methanol industry and is committed to product stewardship. “The Methanol Institute provides unique methanol-related services; a primary goal is ensuring the safe handling of methanol throughout the distribution chain, and also the proper use of methanol in any downstream applications.”

Acme believes that an investigation, such as the one CSB is conducting, should be a fact-finding activity to learn from experience, not an exercise designed to allocate blame or liability. There should be full cooperation between the operational staff at the facility and those involved in the investigation. Accordingly, Acme and the Methanol Institute are encouraged by how the CSB has conducted the investigation and we look forward to the final report. Perhaps more importantly, Acme, along with the global methanol industry, seeks to communicate the knowledge from the CSB investigations to customers worldwide.

For further information and updates go to Acme and Methanol Institute web sites:

www.acmemethanol.com

www.methanol.org

6 Product Stewardship

MI members are committed to promoting the safe management of methanol throughout the entire life cycle of the product, from design through production and use, to the final disposal or elimination, consistent with the principle of “Product Stewardship.” The Methanol Institute and individual members have demonstrated their commitment to help prevent incidents during the handling and use of methanol by downstream users. They feel they have a responsibility for their products, and therefore should create full awareness of any potential hazards that could arise in the use, handling, storage or disposal of methanol, and should provide assistance and/or guidance if necessary.

In working within the chain of commerce, MI members are guided by the following principles:

- Provide technology, information and assistance to contractors, distributors, transporters, customers and users so that they can follow appropriate prevention practices
- Ensure all are aware of the services provided by the Methanol Institute, which serves as a forum for channeling the collective experience of its members towards the development of resources, which are available to both members and nonmembers
- Ultimately, companies must determine whether customers can safely handle methanol; if this cannot be determined, judgment is exercised to decide whether to serve such customers

6.1 Methanol Institute Programs

The Methanol Institute and its research arm, the Methanol Foundation, seek to represent the global methanol industry. Part of the institute’s mission is to direct international efforts relating to methanol product stewardship and regulatory affairs. The MI product stewardship focus is on ensuring understanding of the physical properties of methanol, and the proper handling precautions that are necessary to ensure safety. While methanol is highly flammable and potentially toxic, by following proper handling, storage and use practices, methanol is a safe and effective chemical and fuel. Thus, the task of MI and its members is to communicate those safe handling guidelines across the global distribution chain and to downstream customers. Increasingly, the preferred method of communication is through its web site: www.methanol.org.

6.2 MI Fact Sheets

The MI web site contains basic, standard information as well as descriptions and links to comprehensive programs. Three core fact sheets are provided: a Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS) that is standard procedure globally, and two fact sheets that should be used to communicate basic health and safety information:

Methanol Health Effects

This document makes the following key points:

- Methanol can be toxic to humans, and is readily absorbed by ingestion and inhalation, and more slowly by skin exposure.
- Methanol is also present in the body through the eating of certain foods, and according to the Food and Drug Administration, as much as 500 milligrams per day of methanol is safe in an adult's body.
- Methanol poisoning can occur through accidental or reckless ingestion, and there are symptoms and appropriate responses.
- Methanol exposure should be avoided and can be managed safely through the proper design of fuel containers and fueling systems.

Methanol Emergency Response

This document contains sections on fire safety, environmental protection, and personal protection and makes the following key points:

- Methanol is fully soluble in water, and is readily biodegradable in both water and soil.
- Vapors of methanol are slightly heavier than air, and may travel some distance along the ground to a source of ignition and flash back.
- Accumulations of vapors in confined spaces may explode if ignited, and containers filled with methanol may rupture violently if exposed to fire or excessive heat for a prolonged duration.
- Methanol flames are almost invisible in bright sunlight conditions, but they may be detected by the heat generated or the burning of other materials. Large amounts of water will remove heat and can be effective in diluting methanol to the point where most fires can be readily extinguished. To prevent fires keep open flames, sparks and oxidants away from methanol.
- If a methanol spill occurs, stop or reduce discharge of material if this can be done without risk. Isolate the spill or leak area immediately for at least 330 to 660 feet (100-200 meters) in all directions. Eliminate all sources of ignition, and stay upwind. Do not touch or walk through the spilled material. Prevent methanol from entering into waterways, sewers, basements or confined areas. A vapor-suppressing foam may be used to reduce vapors.
- As a flammable and potentially toxic chemical, caution must be exercised to avoid contact with methanol. At all times, avoid prolonged or repeated breathing of methanol vapors. Methanol should always be kept within closed systems or approved containers. Symptoms of acute methanol exposure may include headache, weakness, drowsiness, nausea, difficult breathing, drunkenness, eye irritation, blurred or loss of vision, loss of consciousness, and possibly death.

6.3 MI and Members Guidance and Publications

The fact sheets provide quick access to useful information. However, the industry understands that comprehensive guidance and training is required to be fully prepared to respond to and manage a crisis situation. Accordingly, MI has developed more comprehensive guidance documents, highlighted member company product stewardship efforts, and partnered with other organizations and customers. MI members are encouraged to make these materials available to their customers and other interested parties. Examples of the materials include the following:

Methanol Safe Handling Manual: A MI-commissioned document, the content and organization is based on the fundamental physical and chemical properties of methanol. The manual focuses on the product stewardship elements of the three critical stages of safe handling: life cycle, transportation, and storage. The manual highlights the technical information necessary to facilitate proper stewardship of methanol in a clear and accessible manner to guide the user during normal operations, as well as in times of extraordinary events.

Methanex DVDs & CDs on Methanol Safety for plant and terminal operations, for vessel crews and for Biodiesel Producers: Methanex, an MI member, commissioned these 15-minute videos that are intended to improve awareness of safe and environmentally sound practices during the handling of methanol in general and in the biodiesel production process. The Methanol Safety videos are available in ten different languages.

6.4 Example Drills and Exercises

Routinely-scheduled drills and exercises are considered critical for maintaining an alert and responsive team for a potentially dangerous incident involving potentially hazardous materials. Rather than conducting small, in-house drills, it has been consistently proven that there are many advantages to involving local and regional officials and authorities in these drills. Acquaintances between operations and local contacts can be vastly enhanced through cooperation in carefully planned and executed emergency simulations. The many important contacts discussed and identified in Chapter 2 about Emergency Management can be included and will appreciate the chance to participate in planning and conducting drills. Two example exercises are provided below.

6.4.1 Washington, D.C. Blue Plains Wastewater Treatment Plant Methanol Chemical Fire Event/Exercise

Washington, D.C.'s Water and Sewer Authority (DCWASA), with support from several other agencies, conducted Operation Snapfire, a small-scale exercise/event intended to simulate the necessary response mechanisms needed to control and contain a methanol fire at the Methanol Unloading Station and methanol above-ground storage tanks at the Blue Plains wastewater treatment facilities. The Blue Plains plant, and more than 200 other wastewater facilities in the U.S., use methanol for a biological nutrient removal process to reduce nitrogen loading into sensitive aquifers.

The scenario was that radical regional environmentalists had increased their verbal and written threats against the Blue Plains facilities after a recent court's decision to allow the agency to continue the current quality of water released from the wastewater treatment plant into the

Potomac and the Chesapeake Bay receiving waters. Under this scenario, on May 14, four unidentified people, presumably associated with one of three radical environmentalist groups, scaled the perimeter fence near the Methanol Unloading Facility. These intruders proceeded to attach several incendiary devices to a methanol tank truck and to two of three above-ground methanol holding tanks. Both the tank truck and all three above-ground methanol holding tanks were impacted from these incendiary devices.

The D.C. Fire Department responded to the scene, with equipment approaching the Methanol Unloading Facility from two directions. The first fire fighters on the scene used an infrared camera to pin-point the location of the methanol fire, as methanol fires can be invisible to the naked eye. The responders then took alcohol-resistant foam mix canisters from a nearby storage shed, and began to spray both the storage tanks and the methanol tank truck with the foam. The exercise achieves several practical objectives: providing an opportunity to test communications among several governmental authorities; allowed fire fighters to become familiarized with the Blue Plains facility; gave the fire fighters actual experience using the alcohol-resistant foam; and identified several areas of need for additional work.

The exercise was enhanced by the involvement of the methanol supplier, which provided a methanol tank truck that was parked at the methanol loading station and sprayed with foam. Management from methanol supplier and MI also participated in the exercise de-brief and contributed valuable technical information and insight.

6.4.2 Corporate Emergency Response Team (CERT) Exercise Two: Marathon Oil

Marathon Oil has been generous in sharing material regarding safety and response approaches. The company feels that “we are all in this together” when it comes to avoiding incidents and optimizing the ability and preparedness of all participants to effectively respond to any incident that might arise.

Railcar Derailment and Spill Event/Exercise:

The following contains excerpts and adaptations from a 2004 simulated drill conducted by Marathon Oil and Marathon Ashland Petroleum (MAP). Although the original drill was centered around an incident involving xylene and low odor based (LOB) solvent, many of the elements that went into the planning, execution and post analysis provide interesting insight for anyone setting out to develop a methanol-related exercise.

This hypothetical situation is intended to have the potential to disrupt and seriously impact the surrounding public, company’s reputation, the company’s bottom line, and the environment.

Objectives

The overall objective of this exercise was to test the efficacy of the refinery response management structure. Specific objectives included:

- Exercise the response management team in responding to a major light product spill
- Increase the proficiency in executing a sustained emergency response
- Identify the major strategic objectives

- Develop a Situation Status Board and Information Center using Incident Command System (ICS) Wall Charts and other information sources
- Identify operational divisions
- Hold several comprehensive assessment meetings so everyone can synch-up, and identify knowledge gaps. Hold planning and command meetings
- Complete an abbreviated Incident Action Plan (IAP) for the next 24 hours
- Demonstrating your ability to prioritize the protection of social, environmental and economically sensitive areas
- Issue several press statements
- Document all the notifications internal and external that would have been made

Ground Rules and Tips for Participants

This exercise was run as a role rehearsal with written and verbal inputs. Asking questions and sharing thoughts were strongly encouraged. Timeouts for clarification and to sort out what is artificial and what is not were also encouraged. Each section was encouraged to put their least experienced person as the section lead. The most experienced person acted as a mentor. All other members filled supporting roles.

Participants were providing an opportunity at the end of the tabletop exercise to consolidate and prioritize what participants' viewed as the next steps for the refinery to enhance its response management capabilities. The list that was developed during this session will be useful in identifying and prioritizing key issues for the overall program, and for individuals with specific emergency response management responsibilities.

Scenario

Four railcars originating from the Catlettsburg refinery are parked on a private siding adjacent to the A.E. Staley Manufacturing complex just outside of Lafayette, IN. Two railcars of xylene and two railcars of LOB solvent are going to be transloaded into trucks whose destination is the Chemrock Corporation. A derailment on an adjacent trunk line collides with all four of our tank cars. All four tankcars have their shells breeched. A ditch, running parallel and adjacent to the rails, travels 400 yards unimpeded into Wildcat Creek which flows 2.0 miles into the Wabash River. Downtown Lafayette begins at 3.3 river miles.

This section of Wildcat creek is a back water of the Wabash, and it runs from 30 to 60 feet wide and is 1 to 8 feet deep. The river bank and river bottom material runs between sandy silt and silty sand. No significant snags or blockages exist. Several exposed sand bars appear in the creek.

The only hazmats involved in the derailment and collision are our four cars. The rest were either empty or carrying coal. The rail road has indicated that they are a victim of sabotage and will not cleanup our mess. The railroad is demanding that we begin cleanup so they can get in and finish getting the trunk line back in operation. Chemrock has not responded and indicates that we are responsible for any damage not caused by Chemrock.

The drill begins with product entering the Wabash. The only responders are two trucks from the Lafayette Fire Department. Currently, they are using water sprays to suppress vapors coming from the tank cars. The strike team and local contractors are in place, but no physical work has been done. There is also a slow flowing canal that flows across the north side of Lafayette through the municipal golf course and into the Wabash approximately 1.4 miles upstream of downtown.

The Wabash Riverfest / Taste of Tippecanoe are underway. The festivities include dragon boat races, concrete canoe races, a general on the water party with 40 restaurant booths, live entertainment, fireworks and beer gardens.

Incident Command

The Fire Department Captain from Lafayette has assumed the On-Scene Incident Commander role. He is giving orders to Marathon Ashland Petroleum personnel who show up on site. He has also stopped all contractors and company personnel from entering the hot zone, because he feels they are inadequately trained and equipped. He is planning to dam up the ditch and perform a controlled burn later.

Operations

The spill occurred six hours ago. Product has just reached the Wabash and has traveled down the canal near just short of Sagamore Parkway. The leaking railcars are intertwined with coal cars. Wildcat Creek is 50' wide, 0.5' to 8' deep and has major snags every 100 feet. The Wabash is 150 yards wide, 0.5' to 12' deep and has minor snags every 300 yards. Both waterways have a current of about one knot.

Planning

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency wants to know what the plan of action is for the next 24 hrs. The Federal On Scene Coordinator (FOSC) also wants to know what the properties of LOB are and what is the solubility of xylene is.

Logistics

A command post needs to be established. The local fire captain does not want us to use the fire stations. Downtown is mobbed, and hotels are running at 85% capacity.

Finance

Both the Railroad and A.E. Staley are seeking loss of use reimbursements, because they can't access their rail line and manufacturing plant respectively. The EPA has shown up with 3 Superfund Technical Assessment & Response Team (START) contractors and the State emergency management agency (EMA) has a two person crew.

Safety

The Fire Department and contractors want to know what are the health effects of the products, the volatility of the products, and whether they might react with coal.

Environmental

The FOSC is concerned about a dissolved plume impacting sensitivities downstream. She wants a monitoring plan for the dissolved constituents and someone to do real time tracking of the plume.

Joint Information

News media representatives from the *Journal & Courier*, *Purdue Exponent*, and WLFI Channel 18 are on site looking for interviews. Stations WLFI, WRTV and WTHR have called for information and are sending reporters to the scene. A student reporter from the *Exponent* wants to know how we could conscientiously ship toxic chemicals into a densely populated community, and are we prepared to deal with the long-term birth defects from exposure to the poisons?

Legal

A shady account rep who is no longer employed by the company cut a deal with the Chemrock Corp. The relevant language in the contract reads: "The buyer takes title and full liability from the seller, when the product passes through unloading flange into the buyer's equipment."

Other facts that have been ascertained:

- The tank car is leased by MAP for our exclusive use. The Lease agreement put all responsibility for response and remediation on Lessee.
- The siding is on short term lease (90 days) from the A. E. Staley Corp to Chemrock for their exclusive use. The lease agreement transfers all general and specific liability to the Lessee.
- A.E. Staley has a sidetrack agreement with Norfolk Southern (CSX) that transfers all Tariffs and Liability to A. E. Staley.

Self Assessment

During the self-assessment portion of the exercise, participants were asked to focus on identifying the strengths and those areas for improvement that may assist the company in responding to future events of this nature. Further, participants were asked to keep following questions in mind:

1. What strengths were identified in the simulated response to this tabletop exercise?
2. What areas in the simulated response and emergency response plans can be improved? (A list of these issues will be established).
3. Based on lessons learned during the exercise, what processes or procedures do you think need to be refined or developed to improve the response coordination and communication?
4. Identify those items you think should be taken to enhance prevention, preparedness, response to and recovery from the variety of possible emergencies that could be faced.
5. What resources, training and other activities do you anticipate would be necessary to enhance the team's capabilities?
6. What is your opinion of the shortened home based training and drill?

Conclusions

This Crisis Communication Guidebook provides useful information and specific examples for companies that produce, handle or use methanol. It supplements the programs and procedures that MI member companies already have in place, and serves as a reminder of the importance of always being prepared to respond to a crisis situation. The Guidebook contains a great deal of useful information, but ultimately it offers two pieces of essential advice:

1. Companies must first undertake several activities to be prepared to react to an unforeseen incident; in particular they must:
 - Identify the roles that make up the Emergency Response Team, and determine which individuals will fill those roles.
 - Gather contact information for local, regional and national important agencies; including emergency responders, governmental functions and the media. Once the contacts have been listed, personal introductions should be made where appropriate.
 - Plan and conduct regular emergency drills and exercises, including having the participation of the appropriate local emergency responders and even the media.
2. Companies must reach out to downstream customers and urge them to accept and act on information, guidance and training offered by MI and its member companies.
 - When an accident occurs at a customer's facility, MI and its members companies may become part of the situation. They may be asked to provide response assistance, and certainly may be questioned by the media, local regulatory bodies, and post incident review bodies.
 - MI and member companies have the knowledge, expertise, and credibility necessary to assist customers, and most importantly to minimize damage to public health and the environment.

Companies and their customers should be aware of, and rely upon resources of the Methanol Institute. In addition to the Crisis Communication Guide, MI has issued a Methanol Safe Handling Manual that provides guidance to distributors, users and their customers. The Manual promotes the safe handling of methanol in order to protect the health of workers, the workplace, the environment, and community.

For information on the Manual and other services go to the MI web site at www@methanol.org or contact Greg Dolan, Vice President, Communications and Policy at gdolan@methanol.org.

APPENDIX I – Key Contacts to Have on File

The point of first contact will vary by political jurisdiction. In the United States, it is typically the municipal or county fire department. However, the first contact could be the police department, office of public safety or environmental protection. It is likely that all of those offices may have a role in any significant response. Thus, names and coordinates should be listed and maintained on file for the point of contact in each of the following offices. This information applies directly to the U.S., but the approach would generally be similar for other countries. The first contact should be with local authorities, but the names and coordinates of key contacts in provincial /regional and national offices should be known as well. The same applies for the media and any key stakeholders.

Local Government (County/Municipality)

<i>Office</i>	<i>Contacts and coordinates</i>
Lead (first person to contact)	
Fire Department	
Police Department	
Public Health	
Environmental Protection	
Local Emergency Planning Committee	

Once appropriate local governmental authorities have been notified, other key local contacts should be informed. Most importantly, contact should be established with the local media and the facility community advisory body, if one exists.

Local Media

<i>Publication/Station</i>	<i>Contacts and coordinates</i>
Local newspaper	
Regional newspaper	
Local television station	
Local radio station	

Community Advisory Body

<i>Chair/Facilitator</i>	<i>Contacts and coordinates</i>
Facility community advisory body	

Typically the local government officials will contact the appropriate state or provincial authorities. However, in some jurisdictions, facility management is responsible for reporting to state authorities as well. Regardless, it is wise to have names and coordinates for the key state contacts.

State/Province

<i>Office</i>	<i>Contacts and coordinates</i>
State Department of Environmental Protection	
State Department of Public Health	
State Emergency Management	
State OSHA	

Depending on the severity of the incident, federal offices may become involved in response measures.

US Federal

<i>Office</i>	<i>Contacts and coordinates</i>
EPA Regional Office, Chemical Emergency Preparedness and Prevention (CEPP)	
EPA Headquarters, CEEP	
National Response Team	

European Union

<i>Office</i>	<i>Contacts and coordinates</i>

Asia

<i>Office</i>	<i>Contacts and coordinates</i>

Facility management should seek assistance from industry and academic experts who can provide useful information and also serve as credible third parties to handle questions from the media. Certainly, the Methanol Institute (MI) should be notified as soon as possible. MI has experience in providing assistance to members during crises; in addition, they have a well-established web site containing a wealth of information and links to other information sources.

Resources

<i>Office</i>	<i>Contacts and coordinates</i>
Methanol Institute	Greg Dolan, VP, 703-248-3636, gdolan@methanol.org
Academic Institutions (local/national college or university)	
Other	

APPENDIX II United States and Global Contacts

There are many useful sources listing key contacts in the United States and other countries.

For **international contacts** an excellent source is the International Directory of Emergency Response Centres for Chemical Accidents. This 132-page document is published by the United Nations and the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development). It is intended to facilitate access to information and assistance provided by response centers located throughout the world, including both OECD and non-OECD countries

The response centers also often provide information and advice on how to prepare for chemical accidents and to establish emergency programs and centers, as well as assistance in responding to chemical accidents themselves.

The International Directory was updated in March 2002 and can be accessed via the following link: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/0/39/1933386.pdf>

In the **United States**, federal incident response is managed through the National Response Team (NRT), an organization of 16 Federal departments and agencies responsible for coordinating emergency preparedness and response to oil and hazardous substance pollution incidents. Additional information on the NRT is available at their web site: <http://www.nrt.org>.

The Environment Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) serve as Chair and Vice Chair respectively. The following is a list of the EPA Headquarters and Regional Offices contacts. In addition, the EPA spill Information Center has a toll free phone number: (800) 424-9346 and a web site: www.epa.gov/superfund/contacts/infocenter

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

EPA Headquarters

Ariel Rios Building

1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, DC 20460

(202) 272-0167, TTY (202) 272-0165

EPA Regional Offices

Region 1 (CT, MA, ME, NH, RI, VT)

Environmental Protection Agency

1 Congress St. Suite 1100

Boston, MA 02114-2023

<http://www.epa.gov/region01/>

Phone: (617) 918-1111

Fax: (617) 565-3660

Toll free within Region 1: (888) 372-7341

Region 2 (NJ, NY, PR, VI)

Environmental Protection Agency

290 Broadway

New York, NY 10007-1866

<http://www.epa.gov/region02/>

Phone: (212) 637-3000

Fax: (212) 637-3526

Region 3 (DC, DE, MD, PA, VA, WV)

Environmental Protection Agency

1650 Arch Street

Philadelphia, PA 19103-2029

<http://www.epa.gov/region03/>

Phone: (215) 814-5000

Fax: (215) 814-5103

Toll free: (800) 438-2474

Email: r3public@epa.gov

Region 4 (AL, FL, GA, KY, MS, NC, SC, TN)

Environmental Protection Agency

Atlanta Federal Center

61 Forsyth Street, SW

Atlanta, GA 30303-3104

<http://www.epa.gov/region04/>

Phone: (404) 562-9900

Fax: (404) 562-8174

Toll free: (800) 241-1754

Region 5 (IL, IN, MI, MN, OH, WI)

Environmental Protection Agency

77 West Jackson Boulevard

Chicago, IL 60604-3507

<http://www.epa.gov/region5/>

Phone: (312) 353-2000

Fax: (312) 353-4135

Toll free: (800) 223-0425 toll free within Region 5: (800) 621-8431

Region 6 (AR, LA, NM, OK, TX)

Environmental Protection Agency

Fountain Place 12th Floor, Suite 1200

1445 Ross Avenue

Dallas, TX 75202-2733

<http://www.epa.gov/region06/>

Phone: (214) 665-2200

Fax: (214) 665-7113

Toll free within Region 6: (800) 887-6063

Region 7 (IA, KS, MO, NE)

Environmental Protection Agency

901 North 5th Street

Kansas City, KS 66101

<http://www.epa.gov/region07/>

Phone: (913) 551-7003

Region 8 (CO, MT, ND, SD, UT, WY)

Environmental Protection Agency

999 18th Street Suite 500

Denver, CO 80202-2466

<http://www.epa.gov/region08/>

Phone: (303) 312-6312

Fax: (303) 312-6339

Toll free: (800) 227-8917

Email: r8eisc@epa.gov

Region 9 (AZ, CA, HI, NV)

Environmental Protection Agency

75 Hawthorne Street

San Francisco, CA 94105

<http://www.epa.gov/region09/>

Phone: (415) 947-8000

(866) EPA-WEST (toll free in Region 9)

Fax: (415) 947-3553

Email: r9.info@epa.gov

Region 10 (AK, ID, OR, WA)

Environmental Protection Agency

1200 Sixth Avenue

Seattle, WA 98101

<http://www.epa.gov/region10/>

Phone: (206) 553-1200

Fax: (206) 553-0149

Toll free: (800) 424-4372